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these agreements are, henceforth per se illegal." The Snap-On Tools Corp.
decision will, in such an eventuality, be meaningless as precedent and, in
effect, overruled.
PAUL E. D'HEDOUV1LLE
Corporations—Protection of Incumbent Management by the Corporate
Purchase of Its Own Stock—Business Judgment Rule.—Bennett v.
Propp.1—Plaintiff-appellee brought a minority shareholders' derivative suit
for an accounting, by the chairman and the board of directors of Noma Lites,
Inc., and also for any damages proximately resulting from the allegedly
improper expenditure of corporate funds in the purchase of the company's
own capital stock. The chairman, without authority, had negotiated purchases
of nearly two hundred thousand shares of Noma common stock in response
to a letter, marked "personal and confidential," from Royal Little, the
executive head of Textron, Inc. Therein was requested a list of Noma
shareholders; it was further indicated that Little desired to obtain a con-
trolling interest in Noma. Textron had previously been unsuccessful in its
bid to garner a control interest in American Screw Company, a corporation
in which Noma held 51 per cent of the outstanding stock, and it appeared that
Little might now attempt to succeed by gaining control of Noma itself.
Learning of the stock purchases only one business day before payment was
due, Noma's board ratified the purchases although the financial instability
of the corporation forced them to effect a loan, at one per cent interest per
month, to meet the two million dollar purchase price. The Vice-Chancellor
found the purchases to have been essentially motivated by the chairman's
desire to further personal interests and preserve favored position; he refused
to apply the business judgment rule to the board's resolution in view of the
"precipitate and impulsive manner" in which they reached their decision.2
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Delaware, it was HELD • the board
was confronted with a fait accompli, which, if left unratified, might well
result in serious financial embarrassment to the corporation. The urgency of
the situation and the nature of the emergency justified the apparent haste
with which the board meeting was conducted as well as the failure to
consider possible alternate avenues of action. The court affirmed the
finding of personal liability as to the chairman!'
The instant case is significant for the insight it may offer into the steps
40 Justice Clark characterized the decision thusly:
Today the Court does a futile act in remanding this case for trial. In my view
appellant cannot plead nor prove an issue upon which a successful defense . . .
can be predicated. Certainly the decision has no precedential value in substantive
anti-trust law.
Supra note 1, at 282-83.
I — Del. —, 187 A.2d 405 (1962).
2 Propp v. Sadacca, — Del. 	 175 A.2d 33 (Del. Ch. 1961).
3 The court renumerated the accepted Delaware position that the board's resolution
could not legalize the unlawful purchases of the chairman so as to exonerate him from
liability. It only served to "take up the stock to save the corporation from financial
difficulty." Supra note 1, at 411.
190
CASE NOTES
management may properly take to protect themselves from the so-called
corporate "raider," although more specifically, the narrow holding concerns
the validity of spending corporate funds for the purchase of its own out-
standing stock. It is an oft commented-upon fact that serious abuses may
result from the improper exercise of such a power, 4 the most relevant and
obvious being that an incumbent management may utilize this authority to
insulate itself, as it were, from potentially insurgent shareholders. 5 Each
jurisdiction, manifesting a cognizance of these dangers, imposes its own
equitable limitations on the exercise of this power,° implicitly recognizing,
however, that the fact that a power may be abused is not in itself a compelling
argument for the complete prohibition of its exercise?
It is fundamental that directors of a corporation are in a fiduciary rela-
tionship to said corporation, and, as such, are bound to act with reasonable
care and intelligence in the conduct of its affairs, although they are not
responsible for mere errors of judgments It is noteworthy that in the case
at bar there was no finding of fraud by the directors; the court made no
definite finding as to the allegation of misconduct, although "statements
made by the court . . . compel the conclusion that the charge of misconduct
was implicitly rejected."s Thus, it is significant that in partly reversing the
lower court, the board was absolved from liability only because of the
potentially destructive effect on the corporation's credit and general financial
position if they had refused to ratify.
To be sure, the corporate purchase of its own shares "is not ordinarily
an essential corporate function," although, in Delaware, it is not per se
invalid." Little light is shed on this perplexing area by attacking a particular
exercise of this power merely because it achieves a perpetuation of a group's
positions and salaries." Indeed, this is a necessary concomitant of any
decision to purchase which is successful in its actual operation. A similar
fact situation was presented in the case of Kors v. Carey, 12 where the stock
purchases were sustained because the evidence "clearly showed" that the
insurgents, if successful, would attempt to force a business policy upon the
4 Ballantine, Law of Corporations § 257 (rev. ed. 1940) ; 1 Hornstein, Corporate
Law & Practice § 491 (1959) ; 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1096 (1962) ; Comment, 70 Yale L.J.
308 (1960).
5 See Comment, 70 Yale L.J. 308 (1.960).
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 160 (1953) provides that a corporation organized under the
relevant chapter of the Delaware laws "may purchase, hold, sell and transfer shares
of its own capital stock; but no such corporation shall use its funds or property for
the purchase of its own shares of capital stock when such use would cause any impair-
ment of the capital of the corporation." See generally Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 5,
¶ 2.02 (1960).
7 Noteworthy in this context is the British position that no company may purchase
its own shares for any purpose. Trever v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409 (1887).
8 Albert E. Touchet, Inc. v. Touchet, 264 Mass. 499, 163 N.E. 184 (1928); Henn,
Handbook of the Law of Corporations § 233 (1961).
9 3 B.C. Ind. & Coln. L. Rev. 531, 532 (1962) ; Propp v. Sadacca, supra note 2, at
38.
10 Martin v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (1952) ;
Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 258, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
11 See 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1096, 1100 (1962).
12 	 Del. —, 158 A.2d 136 (Del. Ch. 1960).
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corporation which defendants, on "manifestly reasonable" grounds, deter-
mined would be detrimental to the best interests of their corporation.
While there was no explicit finding in Kors that the corporation would
have been damaged if the insurgents gained control, the court stated that
plaintiff's proof failed to establish fraud or misconduct such as would compel
a finding of breach of fiduciary duty. 13
The lower court in the present case found that Textron posed no
immediate threat to Noma, special emphasis was given to the fact that
Little had not, as yet, obtained any stock in the corporation. It is un-
fortunate that this proved determinative for the court in distinguishing this
case from the principles enunciated in Kors. There was at no time an
evaluation of the character of Royal Little or the interests and intentions
he represented. While the lower court was reversed on its distinguishing Kors
because of the "extensive consideration" the board gave to the decision
to purchase,14
 its dismissal of Little's letter as not constituting an immediate
threat to Noma was accepted.
It is arguable that the board was faced with a situation which reasonably
appeared to preface a serious attempt at stock purchase by Textron. The
Chancellor's characterization of the letter as no more than a "thinly-veiled
attempt to induce Sadacca and his fellow stockholder-directors to sell out to
Little,"15
 is open to question. More important, however, are the disturbing
implications suggested by this decision. The acknowledged advantages ac-
cruing to management when engaged in a proxy contest,m and the potential
abuses of the power to purchase corporation stock with corporate funds by a
group determined to preserve its position are surely relevant considerations
in analyzing the inadequacies of modern corporate structure and practices.
A purely objective decision by a board which is in danger of being ousted
from power is not always to be expected." Nevertheless, an equally "realistic"
approach would suggest that while the purest of motives behind a challenge
to management is that a change would result in a sounder and more
profitable organization, it remains that control has added value that follows
regardless of the virtue of the individual shareholder. The emoluments of
office will similarly accrue to the insurgent shareholder or corporate raider if
he is successful.
15 Id. at 141 .
14 Supra note 1, at 409.
15 Ibid. The letter read essentially as follows:
At the Textron directors' meeting Wednesday, November 26, I am going to
ask the Board to consider making an offer to purchase 472,143 shares (more
than 50%) of the stock of Noma.. .. Any such offer would be made on a basis
where the first shares deposited would be taken up, not on a pro rata basis.
I would like to have you let me know whether you would be willing to
supply . . . a stockholders' list for the purpose of making such an offer.
We believe that through such an offer we can gain control of both Noma
Lites, Inc. and American Screw Company with a smaller total investment than
we 'had planned to pay for American Screw Company alone.
Since this matter is of a confidential nature, we naturally will not publicize
it until after we have received your reply.
16 Aranow & Einhorn, Proxy Contests for Corporate Control (1957) ; Berle,
"Control" in Corporate Law, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1212 (1958).
17 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1100 (1962).
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The difficulties inherent in applying a test of motive—personal gain
rather than policy considerations—is well documented in the context of the
expenditure of corporate funds in proxy contests.18 It would seem that
directors should be able "in the exercise of an honest business judgment" to
adopt "a valid method of eliminating what appears to them a clear threat
to the future of their business."9 This does not give the directors an "un-
controllable" weapon against shareholder challenge, yet it achieves what
are here suggested to be desirable ends. The corporation will not be forced to
engage in costly and most often wasteful proxy fights in the name of
furthering corporate democracy; it would not, under the facts of the case at
bar, have to wait until the raider obtained a foothold in the company and im-
proved his bargaining position for the ultimate "sell-out"; it could eliminate
a dissentient faction for valid business purposes. At the same time, the court
would not have foreclosed the possibility of an independent inquiry into the
actions of the incumbent management if plaintiff could show fraud, bad
faith or misconduct.
NORMAN I. JACOBS
Labor Law—Collective Bargaining Agreements—Procedural Arbitra-
tion.—Livingston v. John Wiley El Sons, Inc.'—District 65, Retail, Whole-
sale, and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, on the basis of a collective
bargaining agreement with Tnterscience Publishing, Inc., brought an action
to compel arbitration on disputes arising over seniority rights, pension plans,
job security and severance and vacation pay, against John Wiley & Sons, a
successor corporation of a consolidation between Interscience and Wiley. It
was undisputed that no notice of any grievance was filed within the four-week
period required by the collective bargaining agreement, nor were any of
the procedures established in the agreement followed.2 The district court,
assuming that the consolidation did not terminate the agreement, denied
the motion to arbitrate on the grounds that the agreement should be so
construed as "to exclude from arbitration matters involving the entire
collective bargaining unit, as distinguished from the individuals comprising
it;" and that even if not so limited, the Union failed to avail itself of the
grievance procedure described in the agreement and thus abandoned any
rights it might have had to arbitrate the dispute The Court of Appeals
12 See Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F.
Delaware law); Hand v. Missouri-Kansas
1944).
12 McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co., 257
Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 Atl.
10 Del. Ch. 358,92 Atl. 255 (1914).
Supp, 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (applying
Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649, 651 (D. Del.
F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1958) ; Davis v. Louisville
654 (1928); In re International Radiator Co.,   
313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 373 U.S. 908 (1963).
2 The collective bargaining agreement set forth "procedures, which shall be
resorted to as the sole means of obtaining adjustment of the difference, grievance, or
dispute" between Interscience and the Union. In another clause, the agreement stated
that "notice of any grievance must be filed with the Employer and with the Union
Shop Steward within four (4) weeks after its occurrence or latest existence. The failure
by either party to file the grievance within this time limitation shall be construed and
be deemed to be an abandonment of the grievance." Id, at 64.
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